Forecasting whether or not initial reports of disease will be followed by a major epidemic 15 is an important component of disease management, guiding optimal deployment of limited 16 resources for surveillance and control. For example, the probability that undetected cases 17 arriving in different countries would lead to a major epidemic was estimated during the 18 2014-16 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, and in the ongoing epidemic in DR Congo. 19
INTRODUCTION 38 39
Infectious disease epidemics in populations of humans, animals and plants represent a 40 recurring risk worldwide [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . An important question for policy-makers towards the start 41 of an outbreak is whether initial cases will lead on to a major epidemic, or whether the 42 pathogen will rapidly die out instead [8, 9] . An important practical consequence is that, if 43 an outbreak is likely to simply fade out, then costly interventions such as vaccination 44
[10,11], culling/felling/roguing of plants or agricultural animals [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] and workplace or 45 school closure [19] may well be unnecessary [20] . 46 48 is newly arrived in a host population, which in its simplest form is given by 49 50 Prob(major epidemic) = 1 − 3 1 5 6 7(5)
,
(1) 51 52 in which R0 is the basic reproduction number of the pathogen and I(0) is the number of 53 individuals that are currently infected. The estimate in equation (1) applies to a wide range 54 of models, including the commonly used Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) and 55
Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) models [21] . It can be derived by assuming that 56 infections occur according to a branching process (see Methods). In some models in 57 which the infected class is sub-divided into different compartments, the value of I(0) must 58 instead be interpreted as the total number of individuals infected at the current time. For 59 example, for the Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed model, the exponent in 60 equation (1) would in fact become E(0) + I(0) [9] . More sophisticated estimates that are 61 based on similar branching process approximations can be derived for models including 62 additional epidemiological detail, such as more complex population structure [22-24] 63 and/or infectious periods that are not exponentially distributed [25, 26] . 64 Concurrent size. An outbreak in which the number of individuals simultaneously 93 infected exceeds the capacity for treatment. 94
Total infections. An outbreak in which the total number of infections exceeds the 95 number of available treatments. 96
Duration. An outbreak that is not contained quickly and therefore persists for an 97 unacceptably long period. 98
99
We investigate under which circumstances the probability of a major epidemic according 100 to each of these definitions coincides with the branching process estimate. In our 101 analyses, as examples we consider three stochastic epidemiological models that are 102 representative of different host responses to infection and capture different routes of 103 transmission. Specifically, we consider the SIS model, the SIR model, and a host-vector 104 model parameterised for Zika virus transmission. For the SIS and SIR models, the 105 standard branching process estimate corresponds to equation (1), and in the case of Zika 106 virus the standard branching process estimate is an adapted version of equation (1) that 107 accounts for host-vector-host transmission (see Methods). 108
109
To motivate our analyses, we note that the three definitions of a major epidemic above 110 might each be applicable in different scenarios. For example, it might be natural to 111 assume that, if the number of individuals infected at any time always remains below the 112 capacity for treatment, then the outbreak is minor since medical care is available for all 113 sick individuals. It is important to recognise that these definitions do not always coincide. In 1665-66, 140 plague affected the village of Eyam in the UK, which famously isolated itself via a self-141 imposed quarantine [43, 44] . The outbreak in the village was long-running, and a large 142 number of individuals were killed (most reports suggest 250-260 out of a total of 350 in 143 the village died, although there is some ambiguity particularly regarding the size of the at-144 risk population [45] ). However, model fits suggest that a maximum of only around 30 145 people were ever infected simultaneously [46] [47] [48] . As a result, this epidemic might have 146 been classified as a major epidemic according to the "Total infections" and "Duration" 147
definitions, yet not under the "Concurrent size" definition, depending on the precise values 148 of the thresholds set in each case. This highlights the need to define a major epidemic 149 carefully, since an individual outbreak may or may not qualify as a major epidemic, 150 depending on the definition used. 151
152
We will show that the probability of a major epidemic depends on precisely how a major 153 epidemic is defined. The probability of a major epidemic under practical definitions may 154 or may not match the branching process estimate. The definition to use should therefore 155 be considered carefully before the major epidemic risk is estimated at the beginning of an 156 emerging outbreak. Only once the notion of a major epidemic has been formally defined 157 -based on criteria of practical relevance -can this risk be properly assessed. We conduct five analyses. In the first three analyses, we calculate the probability of a 171 major epidemic under the "Concurrent size" definition for the stochastic SIS model, the 172 SIR model and the Zika host-vector model. Our final two analyses focus on the stochastic 173 SIS model. We calculate the probability of a major epidemic under other definitions of a 174 major epidemic (the "Total infections" and "Duration" definitions). In each of these five 175 analyses, we compare the probability of a major epidemic for the particular model-major 176 epidemic definition pairing considered to the commonly used branching process 177 approximation for the probability of a major epidemic which does not require a major 178 epidemic to be defined formally. 179 180 Here, we describe the epidemiological models that we use, calculation of the branching 181 process approximation to the probability of a major epidemic for each model, and how the 182 probability of a major epidemic can be calculated under the "Concurrent size" definition 183 for each of the models considered. We then explain how the probability of a major 184 epidemic under the other practically relevant definitions of a major epidemic can be 185 obtained for the SIS model, although our methodology generalises immediately to any 186 model for which a method of stochastic simulation is available. in which is again a parameter governing the infection rate, and is the rate of 216 removal. In the analogous stochastic model, the net rate at which any epidemiological 217 event occurs is still + , and the probability that the next event is an infection event 218
is similarly unchanged at @7A @7ABC7 . However, the other possible next event is a removal, 219 which occurs with probability C7 @7ABC7 . The basic reproduction number is again 220
Zika transmission model 223
We consider the transmission of Zika virus according to the host-vector model of 224 
The parameters and G govern the rates at which infectious vectors infect susceptible 238 hosts and infectious hosts infect susceptible vectors, respectively. The mean latent 239 periods of infections in hosts and vectors are given by 1/ J and 1/ G . The parameter 240 is the rate of removal of infectious hosts, and describes the death rate of every vector. 241
In the analogous stochastic model, the number of infected human hosts arising from a 242 single infected human (accounting for human-vector-human transmission) in an 243 otherwise entirely susceptible population of humans and vectors is given by 244
is the expected number of vectors infected (and going on to enter 248 the exposed class) by a single infectious human, P Q → 7 Q = U Q VBU Q is the proportion of 249 exposed vectors that become infectious and 5 GJ = S V is the expected number of 250 humans infected by a single infectious vector. 251
252
The basic reproduction number is given by 253
where the square root accounts for the fact that it takes two generations for infected 257 humans to generate new infections, since new infections require host-vector-host 258 transmission [50,51]. We note that in some studies, e.g. [49] , the square root is omitted 259 from the definition of 5 . In contrast to the expression calculated by Kucharski et al. [49] , 260 to facilitate simulation of the stochastic model we also explicitly track the total number of 261 vectors, G , rather than the density. 262 263 Probability of a major epidemic (branching process estimate) 264 265
Standard estimate (stochastic SIS/SIR models) 266
The commonly used estimate for the probability of a major epidemic when a pathogen 267 first arrives in a host population [8, 9, 21, 27, [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] can be derived by assuming that 268 infections occur according to a branching process, making the assumptions that the 269 susceptible population is large and that infection lineages arising from different infected 270 hosts are independent. When a single infected host arrives in an otherwise susceptible 271 population, the branching process estimate for the probability of a major epidemic is given 272 This expression is derived in Text S1. 277
If instead there are I(0) infected individuals initially rather than one, then for no major 279 epidemic to occur, it is necessary for each initial infection lineage to die out, leading to 280 the approximation given in equation (1) Here we show how the branching process estimate for the probability of a major epidemic 284 can be derived for more complex systems by considering the stochastic version of the 285 model of Zika virus given by the system of equations (4). Invasion probabilities have been 286 estimated previously for vector-borne pathogens, for example by considering the 287 distributions of secondary infections from infected hosts/vectors and their associated 288 probability generating functions [22], however we use an alternative approach here that 289 is straightforward to understand and extend to a range of epidemiological settings. 290
291
We denote the probability of no major epidemic occurring starting from i exposed or 292 infectious human hosts, j exposed vectors and k infectious vectors by qijk. We must 293 consider exposed and infectious vectors separately to account for the possibility that 294 exposed vectors die before becoming infectious. starting from a single exposed or infectious vector gives 302
We again assume that infection lineages are independent, permitting us to approximate 305 terms with two exposed or infectious individuals by non-linear terms involving single 306 exposed or infectious individuals, e.g. SS5 ≈ S55 5S5 . Noting that 555 = 1, the three 307 equations above can be solved to give expressions for S55 , 5S5 and 55S . In particular, 308 the probability of a major epidemic starting from a single infected host is then 309 1 − S55 = Y 0 for 5 ≤ 1, ( 5 ) a − 1 ( 5 ) a + 5 GJ for 5 > 1.
(5) 310
In this expression, 5 GJ is the expected number of humans infected by a single infectious 311 vector in an otherwise entirely susceptible population of humans and vectors. 312 313 Probability of a major epidemic ("Concurrent size" definition) 314
315
As described in the introduction, we first define a major epidemic to be an outbreak in 316 which the maximum number of simultaneously infected individuals is above a threshold 317 value, which we denote by M. The value of M of relevance in practical applications might 318 be set by the capacity for treatment. 319
Deterministic SIS and SIR models 321
In the deterministic SIS model, the maximum number of simultaneously infected 322 individuals over the course of the outbreak is given by We also consider the probability of a major epidemic according to the deterministic and 408 stochastic SIS model for the "Total infections" and "Duration" definitions of a major 409 epidemic. Under the "Total infections" definition, a major epidemic is assumed to be an 410 outbreak in which at least F infections occur over the course of the outbreak. Under the 411 "Duration" definition, a major epidemic is defined to be an outbreak that persists for at 412 least T days. 413
414
In the deterministic SIS model, whenever 5 > 1, the outbreak persists indefinitely with 415 an infinite number of infection events. As a result, any outbreak is a major epidemic under 416 the "Total infections" and "Duration" definitions. 417
418
In contrast, in any simulation of the stochastic SIS model, the number of infected 419 individuals will always reach zero, even if this takes a long time. As a result, the probability 420 of a major epidemic under the "Total infections" and "Duration" definitions is not simply 421 one or zero depending on the value of 5 . We approximate the probability of a major 422 epidemic under these definitions by simulating the model 10,000 times using the Gillespie 423 direct method [53] , and recording the proportion of simulations in which there are at least 424 F infections or that have a duration of at least T days. 425 426 3. RESULTS
428
To begin to understand outbreak dynamics under the SIS, SIR and Zika transmission 429 models, we first numerically solved the deterministic models given by the systems of 430 equations (2), (3) and (4) with 5 = 1.5 in each case (Fig 2) . In a deterministic setting, the 431
SIS model predicts the largest number of individuals simultaneously infected as well as 432
the most infections in total. Epidemics persisted forever (i.e. I remained larger than zero) 433 under all three models, although the number of infected hosts tended to zero under the 434 SIR and Zika transmission models. 435 436 However, our main focus is the probability of a major epidemic soon after the pathogen 437 enters the system. For any definition of "major epidemic", according to a deterministic 438 model the corresponding probability is either zero or one depending on the values of 439 model parameters. We therefore considered the more realistic stochastic models, in 440 which demographic stochasticity is included. In the following sections, first we calculate 441 the probability of a major epidemic for the stochastic SIS model under the "Concurrent 442 size" definition. We then consider different epidemiological models, as well as different 443 definitions of a major epidemic. In each case, the probability of a major epidemic for the 444 For R0 much larger than one, we found that the probability of a 468 major epidemic was approximated closely by the standard branching process estimate 469 for many values of the major epidemic threshold, M. When, however, R0 was close to 470 one, the standard estimate corresponded to a single choice of M (see e.g. blue lines in 471 In large host populations, the probability of a major epidemic as a function of M took the 492 form of a step function (Fig 3b) . This suggested that, if the pathogen successfully invaded 493 the population, then the number of infected individuals would definitely reach a specific 494 maximum value which is determined by R0. For example, for outbreaks with R0 = 1.5, the 495 pathogen will invade the population with probability 0.33, and, if this occurs, then around 496 two-thirds of the population will be infected simultaneously at some time during the 497 epidemic. invades in the stochastic SIS model, I will fluctuate approximately symmetrically around 507 the deterministic equilibrium value (Fig 3d) . It is likely, then, that by the time the pathogen dies out by reaching I = 0, the number of infected individuals will at some stage also have 509 reached approximately double the value it fluctuated around too. In Fig 3b, when N =  510 10,000, this approximation gives a maximum proportion of the population simultaneously 511 infected of 0.67, when the true value is 0.62. 512
513
We also note that, if the expression above for max(I) is reformulated to give the maximum 514
proportion of the population that is simultaneously infected, the resulting expression is 515 independent of the population size N. This can also be seen graphically -in Fig 3b, if the 516 pathogen successfully invaded the population then the maximum proportion of hosts that 517 were simultaneously infected was approximately independent of the size of the host 518 population, so long as N was sufficiently large. 519 520 521
Different epidemiological models 522 523
We considered the probability of a major epidemic ("Concurrent size" defintion) under the 524 SIR and Zika virus transmission models. For the stochastic SIR model, we used an 525 iterative method to calculate the probability of a major epidemic as described in Methods. Under the stochastic SIR and Zika models, for R0 larger than and not close to one, the 549 maximum number of simultaneously infected individuals whenever the pathogen invaded 550 the host population was typically smaller than under the SIS model (cf. Fig 2) . 551 Nonetheless, we found qualitatively similar behaviour in these cases -the probability of 552 a major epidemic approximated using a branching process corresponded to a wide range 553 of values of the major epidemic threshold when R0 was high (Fig 4) . However, even if that 554 is the case, the practically relevant value of the major epidemic threshold (e.g. the number 555 of available hospital beds) may not give a probability of a major epidemic that matches 556 the branching process estimate. For example, if R0 = 2 and 250 beds are available, for 557 the SIR model the probability of a major epidemic under the "Concurrent size" definition 558 is 0 (solid grey line in Fig 4a) , yet the branching process estimate for the probability of a 559 major epidemic is 0.5 (dotted grey line in Fig 4a) . For the stochastic SIS model, we then calculated the probability of a major epidemic for 564 different definitions of a major epidemic -specifically, outbreaks in which there are at 565 least F infection events (the "Total infections" definition - Fig 5a) or outbreaks that persist 566 for at least T days (the "Duration" definition - Fig 5b) . 
result, in these specific cases (i.e. when the stochastic SIS model was used and a major 587 epidemic was defined according to the "Total infections" or "Duration" definitions) it can 588 be concluded that the branching process approximation often leads to sensible estimates 589 of the risk posed by invading pathogens. Nonetheless, even in these cases, for small or 590
very large values of the major epidemic thresholds the probability of a major epidemic 591 does not match the branching process estimate, particularly when 5 was larger than but 592 close to one (see e.g. red line in Fig 5b) . 593
594

SIS model SIR model
Zika host-vector model R0 = 1.1 21 ≤ ≤ 54 (Fig 3a) 18 ≤ ≤ 21 (Fig 4a) 6 ≤ ≤ 7 (Fig 4b) R0 = 1.6 8 ≤ ≤ 681 (Fig 3a) 8 ≤ ≤ 55 (Fig 4a) 3 ≤ ≤ 47 (Fig 4b) R0 = 2 6 ≤ ≤ 866 (Fig 3a) 7 ≤ ≤ 117 (Fig 4a) 2 ≤ ≤ 83 (Fig 4b) 595 Fig 3a) 138 ≤ ≤ 878 (Fig 5a) 183 ≤ ≤ 458 (Fig 5b) R0 = 1.6 8 ≤ ≤ 681 (Fig 3a) ≥ 18 (Fig 5a) ≥ 51 (Fig 5b) R0 = 2 6 ≤ ≤ 866 (Fig 3a) ≥ 10 (Fig 5a) ≥ 34 (Fig 5b) Our intention here was to use very simple models to demonstrate the principle that 700 different definitions of a major epidemic lead to different probabilities of a major epidemic. 701
Although simple models are commonly used, accurate outbreak forecasts require a model 702 carefully matched to the epidemiology of the host-pathogen system, potentially including 703 asymptomatic transmission [9, 62, 63] or spread between spatially distinct regions [29, 64] . 704
For certain definitions, it may be necessary to include convalescent hosts in the model 705 explicitly. For example, if convalescent individuals require resources, such as beds in 706 treatment rooms or hospitals, and the definition of a major epidemic is linked to the 707 availability of resources (as in the case of the "Concurrent size" definition), then these 708 individuals should be modelled, potentially by including them in a new compartment 709 following the infectious class. More complex definitions of major epidemics could also be 710 used, for example requiring multiple criteria to be satisfied for an outbreak to be classified 711 as a major epidemic. In these more complicated scenarios, analytic calculations of the 712 probability of a major epidemic might not be possible. Model simulations can then be used 713 to assess the probability of a major epidemic, as we showed for a host-vector model of 714
Zika virus transmission (Fig 4b) . 715
716
We note that practical use of the methods presented here at the start of an emerging 717 outbreak to assess the major epidemic risk would require the wide range of interventions 718 that are introduced in outbreak response settings to be integrated into the models 719 explicitly. One way in which control can be included is to consider the effective 720 reproduction number when the pathogen arrives in the system instead of the basic 721 reproduction number, since the effective reproduction number accounts for interventions 722 [26,54,55,65-67]. In that case, the results that we presented would be unchanged (except 723 that e.g. the lines in Fig 3a would correspond to different values of the effective 724 reproduction number). Temporal changes in interventions once an outbreak is underway 725 have been approximated in epidemiological models by assuming that the values of the 726 parameters governing transmission change during the outbreak, either by assuming that 727 transmissibility changes at a single timepoint [68, 69] 
